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THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM UNDER EMBODIMENT 
 













We study technology adoption in an optimal growth model with embodied 
technical change. The economy consists of the final good sector, the capital sector, and 
the technology sector which role is the imitation of exogenous innovations. Labor 
resources are scarce. They are freely allocated to the technology and final good sectors. 
The final good is freely allocated to consumption and to the capital sector. We 
analytically characterize the optimal allocation decisions in the long run. Using a 
calibrated version of the model, we find that an acceleration in the rate of embodied 
technical change should not be responded by an immediate and strong adoption effort. 
Instead, adoption labor should decrease in the short run, and the optimal technological 
gap is shown to increase either in the short or in the long run. The state of the 
institutions and policies around the technology sector is key in the design of the optimal 
adoption timing. 
  
Keywords: Embodiment, Technology adoption, Technological gap, Transition 
dynamics. 
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In the recent years, the North-South digital divide has been the main con-
cern of many policy oriented studies and committees. Many bodies now
exist that all focus on the stakes involved by the digital divide. The G8 Dot
Force, established at the 2000 Okinawa G8 summit, was among the ﬁrst.
More recently, in 2002, the United Nations have launched their Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT) Task Force, and it is frequent to
read in the oﬃcial publications of many industrial countries some explicit
statements like the following: ”bridging the North-South digital divide is a
priority for the foreign co-operation policy”.1
In this context, many developing countries have undertaken a signiﬁcant
eﬀort in ICT equipment investment, specially in Asia and Latin America.
Figure 1 displays the patterns of ICT expenditures in six Latin American
countries over the period 1992-2001. In Brazil, Chile and especially Colom-
bia, this eﬀort has been tremendous. The Brazilian ICT expenditures have
increased from less than 4% of GDP in 1992 to more than 8% in 2001. Chile
has followed almost the same pattern. ICT expenditures have tripled in
Colombia over the same interval, reaching 12% in 2001! Overall there is a
clear technology adoption eﬀort in this part of the world, though it is un-
evenly distributed across countries.
Beside the issue of the connectivity of the South, which is certainly very
important to address properly, one may question the relevance of the North-
South digital divide problem as a key and urgent development issue, and the
subsequent technology adoption and transfer programs. After all, the ICT
growth enhancing eﬀect is still at the heart of a tough debate even on the US
economy (see Gordon, 2000). Moreover, the existing (and very long) record
of technology transfers calls for much more caution in the assessment of the
potential ICT contribution to the economic development of the South. In
particular, the two following lessons are worth pointing out.
(i) First, technology adoption programs are usually undermined by the
institutional barriers inherent to developing countries. As reported by Niosi,
Hanel and Fiset (1995) using a survey of the performances of some 50 major
international technology transfer projects, the costs associated with lack of
transferee expertise and poor training, and those induced by the administra-
1French inter-ministerial committee, July 10th, 2002.
3Figure 1: Information and communication technology expenditure























tive restrictions set by the host governments are key in explaining the success
or failure of a project.
(ii) Second, even if the host governments are keen at easing technology
transfers and facilitating their implementation, it is absolutely unclear to
what extent these transfers will beneﬁt to the whole economy. In other
words, the expected spillovers from such transfers are doubtful. It goes with-
out saying that local conditions are crucial in determining the magnitude
of the spillovers. For example, it appears that spillovers are likelier in
sectors with simpler technologies (see the excellent work of Grether,
1999). Again, Latin American countries were among the ﬁrst in the South to
facilitate technology transfers by removing discriminatory measures against
foreign direct investment, and more generally by carrying out comprehensive
trade liberalization programs. This policy has been especially intensive from
the mid- eighties. Figure 2 displays the patterns of GDP per hour in six Latin
American countries over the period 1960-2001. With the notable exception
of Chile, there is no apparent positive trend, especially if we focus on the
sub-period 1980-2001. This is obvious in the Mexican case, a country which
4Figure 2: GDP per hour in 1990 GK $. Source : World Development
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is well-known for its trade liberalization policy (see again Grether, 1999).
In short, even in the absence of institutional barriers to adoption, technol-
ogy transfers are unlikely to be successful if the transferred technologies are
sophisticated, essentially because of lack of skills. However, the technology
conveyed by the ICT is speciﬁc and sophisticated. First of all, it is vintage
capital speciﬁc. It makes no sense to separate the Pentium technology from
its physical support! Technological progress is therefore embodied in capital
goods. Second, the new ICT tools are increasingly sophisticated. To take ad-
vantage of the invention of the early electrical tools, one had just to switch on
a light, but using a computer is markedly more complicated. In the context
of a developing country (low quality of labor, limited technological absorp-
tion), this characteristic of the new capital goods (more sophistication) is
likely to radically change the trade-oﬀs of technology adoption. This paper
is primarily designed to investigate this point in details and to develop a
theory of economic development under embodiment.
5The role of embodiment in the growth process of the industrialized countries
has been intensively studied in the recent years, notably in the US economy.
As documented in Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), two major stylized facts
seriously undermine the neoclassical growth model: The steady decrease in
the relative price of equipment investment and the secular rise in the equip-
ment investment to GDP ratio. Both are incompatible with the long term
properties of the neoclassical growth model. In contrast, these two facts can
be rationalized in a canonical two-sector growth model assuming that part of
technological advances are speciﬁc to the capital goods sector (the so-called
embodiment hypothesis). Using this approach, Greenwood, Hercowitz and
Krusell (1997) found that around 60% of post-war US productivity growth
can be attributed to embodied technological change. More theoretical stud-
ies on the implications of the embodied nature of technical change for long
term growth can be found in Krusell (1998), Benhabib and Hobijn (2002),
and Boucekkine, del Río and Licandro (2001, 2002).
Our objective is to study to which extent the embodiment characteristic
matters in the technology adoption decisions in the context of a developing
country. The basic structure of the models we would like to analyze is the
following. The economy consists of three sectors: the sector producing the
ﬁnal good, the sector producing the capital goods, and the technology sector.
Technological progress is embodied in capital goods. The technology sector
does not conduct any R&D activity. Its unique role is the adoption (or im-
itation) of the innovations coming from abroad. However, the technological
absorption is limited in that it is never feasible to close the technological gap
with respect to abroad as in Nelson and Phelps (1966). We consider optimal
growth models in which a benevolent central planner enforces the social op-
timum by choosing the best consumption, investment and adoption patterns
for the economy.2 To this end, he has to settle some resource allocations
problems involved in the economy. For example, he has to ensure that the
(scarce) skilled labor resources are optimally assigned to both the technology
and the ﬁnal good sectors. What could an optimal adoption plan in such a
context? How should the economy react to a technological acceleration? Is
an immediate and massive adoption eﬀort optimal in this case?
To tackle these issues, we organize the paper as follows. The next section
gives the analytical structure of the model. It also derives the corresponding
2Since the model does not rely on any externality, imperfect competition or incom-
pleteness ingredient, the social optimum can be trivially decentralized.
6balanced growth paths and some interesting comparative statics. Section 3
is devoted to the analysis of the short term dynamics. Section 4 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l







Kt = qtIt +( 1− δ)Kt−1 (2)




t − qt) (3)
Equation (1) gives the production function in the ﬁnal good sector at any
date t.T h e ﬁnal good (Yt)i sp r o d u c e dw i t hc a p i t a l( Kt)a n dl a b o r( Lt).
At is technological progress in the ﬁnal good sector. Note that this form of
technological progress is independent of the pace of capital accumulation, it
is therefore disembodied. The parameter α measures as usual the capital
share.
Equation (2) is the production function in the capital sector. Capital is pro-
duced according to a linear production function with a unique input, the ﬁnal
good. The amount of ﬁnal good used to increase the capital stock and to re-
place the depreciated fraction of it (namely δKt−1 where δ is the depreciation
rate) is denoted It. qt is technological progress in the capital good sector.
In contrast to At, qt is speciﬁc to capital goods: It is embodied in capital
goods. Equation (2) is exactly the production function of equipment goods
considered by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997). However, in con-
trast to these authors, we shall endogenize the embodied part of technological
progress, as measured by qt.
Precisely, we assume that there is a third sector, say an imitation sector,
which production technology is given by equation (3). This sector ensures
an increasing pattern for the level of embodied technical progress, qt. q◦
t is
the level of (embodied) technical progress abroad at date t. ut is the labor
resources allocated to this sector, and dt is an exogenous variable represent-
ing any potential shock to this sector. For example, dt may represent an
exogenous improvement of the productivity of labor in the imitation sector
(coming from an improvement in the quality of the skills) or a trade policy
7reform easing technology transfers. It is readily checked that equation (3)
implies that the level of embodied technological progress in the economy at
date t, qt, is a convex combination of the technological level abroad at date
t, and of the technological level of the economy at t − 1, qt−1. In the case
of a developing country, we must assume: qt−1 <q ◦
t. It follows that qt <q ◦
t,
∀t. The technological absorption capacity of a developing country is limited,
and the technological gap cannot be closed at any ﬁxed date t. Indeed, the















It follows that the technological gap can only vanish asymptotically. And it
does so if and only if either the exogenous variable dt or the labor assignment
ut goes to inﬁnity when t tends to inﬁnity. In this paper, we assume that
the productivity variable dt has no (positive or negative) trend. We also
assume that the (skilled) labor resources of this developing economy are
limited at any date. Either dt or the amount of skilled labor can increase
permanently following an exogenous shock but, since our goal is to model
under-developed economies, we do not incorporate any internal or external
mechanism assuring a cumulative and balanced law of motion for these two
magnitudes. More precisely, the following resource constraints hold:
Lt + ut =1 (5)
Yt = Ct + It (6)
Therefore, we assume that total (skilled) labor resources are constant over
time and we normalize them to 1. These resources have to be allocated to two
sectors: the sector producing the ﬁnal good and the imitation sector. The
ﬁnal good is used for consumption, Ct, and as an input in the production
of capital goods, It. How should the economy choose the allocation of labor
resources to the production of the ﬁnal good Vs the imitation sector? How
should the economy choose the allocation of the ﬁnal good to consumption
Vs the capital sector? We shall address these questions within an optimal
growth set-up in the next section. A ﬁnal comment before. We assume that
there is no inter-action between the embodied and disembodied components
of technological progress: qt is endogenous and At is not. According to
8some New Economy enthusiasts (see Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1998, for
example), the productivity gains registered in the capital goods sectors (eg.
hardware production) will eventually spillover to the rest of the economy,
which is likely to lead to a permanent rise in aggregate productivity growth.
That is qt growth will have an impact on At after a (long) adjustment period.
This view of embodiment is far from unanimously accepted (see Gordon,
2000, again), and there is no unquestionable statistical evidence so far sup-
porting it. Applied to under-developed countries, this spillover question is
much simpler. As outlined in the introduction, most empirical studies tend
to show that there is no spillover at all, especially when the technology im-
ported is sophisticated. So, consistently with this overwhelming evidence and
with our assumptions on the capacity of technological absorption and human
capital endowment, we assume that there is no inter-action between qt and
At.T h ee ﬀects of an increasing level of disembodied technical progress will
be simply examined through permanent shocks exercises on At.
2.1 The central planner problem
We consider the following optimal growth problem:
Max





subject to equation (1) to (5), given q−1 and K−1 and the corresponding
positivity constraints (notably 0 ≤ ut ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ Lt ≤ 1). U(.) is a
standard utility function and β < 1 is the time discounting factor. The
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9where w and λ are the multipliers associated with the labor market clearing
condition (5) and with the imitation technology (3), respectively.3 Equation
(7) gives the optimal intertemporal consumption (or saving) plan. It is a com-
pletely standard Keynes-Ramsey rule if o n ea b s t r a c t sf r o mt h ep r e s e n c eo ft h e
q terms. In particular, it implies that the optimal growth rate of consump-





the discount rate β, and the depreciation rate δ. For example, the higher
the marginal productivity of capital, the stronger the incentives to save and
the higher the expected growth rate of consumption. When we account
for embodied technological progress, the Keynes-Ramsey rule is modiﬁed in
two aspects. Since the capital goods are increasingly eﬃcient over time,
the marginal productivity of capital should incorporate this eﬃciency. It is
expressed in eﬃciency units in equation (7), ie. it is multiplied by qt.
On the other hand, it should be noted that, consistently with Greenwood,
Hercowitz and Krusell (1997), the price of the capital good in terms of the
consumption good is 1
qt in our model: For each unit of forgone consumption
at t, the economy can build up qt units of capital at t. Suppose that qt is in-
creasing, then the relative price of capital is decreasing, and the consumption
good is expected to be more expensive over time, and consumption is likely
to fall in the future. This eﬀect is called obsolescence eﬀect by Boucekkine,
del Río and Licandro (2002); it is inherent to embodied technical change and
it tends to lower the growth eﬀects of the latter.
Equations (8) and (9) are the optimality conditions with respect to produc-
tion labor and adoption labor respectively. In each equation, the marginal
productivity of labor is equal to the shadow wage. Since labor is homoge-
nous, we have a unique shadow wage. Equation (10) is the optimal condition
with respect to qt. The left hand side is the beneﬁt from a marginal increase
in qt: such an increase will allow to raise the capital stock by It in eﬃciency
units, which is equal by equation (2) to
Kt−(1−δ)Kt−1
qt ,a n db yIt
qt in physical
units (in terms of the consumption good), which in turn allows to raise utility
by U  (Ct) It
qt. The right hand side gives the cost of a marginal increase in qt.
Notice that λt is by deﬁnition, the shadow price of qt. The right hand side of
equation (10) is the marginal cost of qt: It includes the usual intertemporal
term λt − βλ t+1, retrieving future value gains from the shadow price, plus
3plus the standard transversality conditions: limt→∞ λt qt =0 ,a n dlimt→∞ λ
 
t Kt =
0,w h e r eλ
 
t is the multiplier associated with the production function of capital goods, (2).
10the less usual term λt dtuθ
t. This term comes entirely from the speciﬁcation of
the imitation technology (3): a marginal increase in qt costs indeed 1+dtuθ
t,
to be multiplied by the shadow price to get eh welfare cost.
We now turn to the analysis of the steady state growth paths.
2.2 The balanced growth paths: existence and com-
parative statics
>From now, we assume a logarithmic utility function. We deﬁne the steady
state growth paths as usual in exogenous growth theory: along the balanced
growth path, ut and Lt are constant and the remaining variables grow at
constant rates. Denoting by gx the long-run growth factor of a variable Xt
and
_
X its long-run level, we have the following simple properties:
Proposition 1 If q0
t grows at rate γ > 1, then all the other variables grow





gC = gI = gY = γ
α
1−α.
Not surprisingly, the growth rate of the capital stock is higher than the other
variables: the capital stock is expressed in eﬃciency units and as such, its
growth rate is the sum of the growth rates of q and I. The long term levels
are much harder to characterize. In order to simplify a little bit, we use
equation (9) to eliminate the multiplier λ. The resulting eight restrictions
a r ea sf o l l o w s :
 




































Y = C + I




The stationary long term system appears very messy. Nonetheless, we can
prove that it has always a unique solution.
Proposition 2 If γ > 1, a unique stationary equilibrium exists for our econ-
omy.
Ad e t a i l e dp r o o fo ft h i sc l a i mi sr e p o r t e di nt h eA p p e n d i x .W ec a na l s op r o v e
analytically the following comparative statics with respect to the technolog-
ical parameters γ and d appearing in the imitation technology.
Proposition 3 Denote by s = I
Y the long term investment ratio. The long-
run technological gap being TG =
(γ−1)




















The proof is in the Appendix. A technological acceleration abroad induce
a stronger adoption eﬀort. However, this increment is not enough to lower
the long term technological gap. This property comes from an important
arbitrage settlement in the model. When u goes up, the amount of labor
devoted to production decreases, which in turn tends to decrease output and
consumption. Moreover, the consumption share in output goes down when
the rate of embodied technological progress is raised. It is very important
to understand why this property holds. Recall that the growth rate of q is
precisely the rate of decline of the relative price of capital. Hence, when γ
increases, this rate of decline decreases, inducing a typical substitution eﬀect
unfavorable to consumption. Overall, consumption tends to decrease for two
reasons when a technological acceleration occurs. A central planner who
cares about consumption per capital should consequently try to alleviate the
induced fall in consumption by producing a moderate adoption eﬀort. Social
12welfare maximization is indeed incompatible with a sharp adoption
eﬀort in the long run.
T h es a m em e c h a n i s m sa r ei n v o l v e dw h e nt h ep r o d u c t i v i t yd of the imitation
sector goes up. This could be the result of a trade reform facilitating adoption
or a permanent improvement in the skills of the employees of the technology
sector. In such a case, the fraction of labor devoted to adoption goes down
but the technological gap goes down too. Given the expression of the long run
technological gap, this means that the product du θ increases when d goes up
despite the reduction in u. It is not hard to understand this result. Produc-
tivity improvements in adoption allow to increase the level of technological
progress even though the labor contribution to this activity diminishes. In
such a case, more labor is assigned to production, and the economy gains
a double advantage: More production (and so more consumption and more
welfare) and lower technological gap. In other words, the ﬁrst best decisions
allow to reduce both the output and technological gaps. Finally in contrast
to the shock on the rate of embodied technical change, a rising d does not
alter the consumption and investment shares in output. Both investment
and consumption will rise, following the output increment, but they do so at
t h es a m eg r o w t hr a t e .T h e r ei sf u n d a m e n t a lr e a s o nf o rt h i s .I nc o n t r a s tt o
the shock on γ,ar i s i n gd d o e sn o ta l t e rt h er a t eo fd e c l i n eo ft h er e l a t i v e
price of capital (precisely equal to γ), which is the crucial determinant the
output composition.
What happens if the technological improvements occur in the ﬁnal good
sector via the disembodied technological progress variable, A? The following
proposition summarizes the ﬁndings regarding this question.
Proposition 4 An increase in A rises (detrended) output, investment, con-
sumption and capital though it has no eﬀect on the investment rate. More-
over, a change in A does not alter the allocation of labor resources between
adoption and production and the induced technological gap.
The proof is trivial, see the Appendix. A rise in A has a direct income ef-
fect which rises consumption and investment as output goes up. However,
the investment rate is unchanged. As in the case of the shock in d,t h e r e
is no change in the rate of decline of the relative price of capital, and the
composition of output remains the same. Much more importantly, the dis-
embodied technological progress level is not a determinant of the allocation
of labor resources across activities, which may be surprising at ﬁrst glance.
13H o w e v e r ,o n es h o u l dk e e pi nm i n dt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nA raises the shadow
wage (since labor marginal productivity is shifted upwards). Since labor is
homogenous and given the optimal labor decisions (8) and (9), the direct
wage impact of the shock in A is identical in the two sectors (ﬁnal good and
technology sectors), and there is no reason to alter the initial allocation of
labor resources across sectors. As a consequence, the technological gap is
also insensitive to the latter variable, since it entirely depends on the adop-
tion of investment-speciﬁc technological progress. If the adoption eﬀort is
unaﬀected, the technological gap is.
3D y n a m i c s
Let us now study the transition dynamics to the steady state growth paths.
Recall that the main objective of this paper is to investigate whether an
immediate and ”massive" adoption eﬀort is optimal in developing countries.
We ﬁrst rewrite the models in terms of the detrended variables. The station-
arized dynamic system is reported in the appendix. We simulate a calibrated
version of this system.4
The benchmark calibration is given by the table below:
Table 1: The benchmark parameterization
α β γ δ θ d A
0.4 0.97 1.02 0.07 0.9 0.12 1
The parameters α, the capital share, β, the time discounting rate, δ,t h e
depreciation rate of capital, and A, the level of disembodied technical change,
have been ﬁxed to some usual values. For a ﬁxed value of d, the remaining
parameters γ, the rate of embodied technical change, and θ, the ”elasticity”
of labor in the imitation technology, have been chosen so as to have share
of consumption in GDP around 70%, and an adoption cost, as measured
by the ratio ”wages paid to the technology sector” to GDP, around 10% in
the benchmark case. The latter reference value has been given by Jovanovic
(1997). In order to illustrate the importance of the institutional and policy
aspects, we additionally consider another calibration which only diﬀers from
4We use Dynare, the package developed by Juillard (1996), for the simulation and
stability assessment of nonlinear forward-looking variables.
14the benchmark in the value of d. Concretely, we consider the case where d
equals ten times the benchmark value. Table 2 gives the long term properties
of the two parameterizations.
Table 2: The long term implications of the calibration















When the economy beneﬁts from an institutional and policy environment
favorable to technology adoption, the optimal amount of labor resources al-
located to the latter activity need not be large, and actually, it is shown to be
lower relatively to the benchmark case. This allows to increase (detrended)
output, consumption and investment, without worsening the technological
gap, which indeed decreases markedly. These properties reﬂect the compar-
ative statics demonstrated in Proposition 3. We now turn to the short term
dynamics. We consider three permanent and unexpected 1% shocks aﬀecting
the economy from t =0 : a shock on the rate of embodied technical progress,
γ;as h o c ko fd and a shock on the level of disembodied technical progress A.
The solution paths are given in Figures 3 to 8. Each solution path represents
the evolution of t h ep e r c e n t a g ed e v i a t i o nof a given variable with respect
to the initial steady state value.
3.1 Optimal adoption under technological acceleration
We ﬁrst analyze how the economy reacts to the γ and the A shocks, as
reﬂected in Figures 3 to 5 for the benchmark case. The main lessons to be
drawn from the experiments are:
15(i) A technological acceleration through γ does not induce an intensiﬁca-
tion of the adoption eﬀort in the short run. Instead, the optimal amount
of labor devoted to the technology sector is below the initial steady
state value for around 8 periods after the shock. Since the technologi-
cal acceleration is permanent, the economy will converge to a higher adoption
labor long run value (by Proposition 3). Hence, it has to increase its adoption
eﬀort after a while. Whether it does so soon or late depends, in particular,
on the settlement of the intertemporal arbitrages and resource competition
problems present in the model. Among other relevant factors, time discount-
ing or impatience induces a short run decrease in labor adoption so as to
increase labor in production, which in turn would increase consumption in
the short run.





















Another important factor is the chosen pattern for the rate of decline of
t h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo fc a p i t a l .I nt h el o n gr u n ,t h i sr a t eg o e su p ,i n v o l v i n ga
change in the composition of output, favorable to investment. So the long
run equilibrium is unfavorable to consumption for two main reasons: a higher
adoption labor and a bigger investment rate. In such a context, an optimal re-
16action in the short run, given the discounted nature of the objective function,
implies more production labor and/or a lower investment rate. In Figures 3
and 5, we see that while the adoption labor goes clearly down in the short
run, there is a very slight increase in the investment rate at t =1 ,i m m e d i -
ately followed by a long transition below the initial steady state value. By
choosing such a behavior, the economy lets the technological gap increase
from t =0(to the new steady state value). Not surprisingly, welfare max-
imization does not produce a decreasing pattern for the technological gap,
neither in the long run (as proved in Proposition 3), nor in the short run.






















(ii) The A shock produces much trickier outcomes. Figures 3 to 5 show a
slight increase in the adoption eﬀort, an almost immobile technological gap
and a sharp rise in the investment rate, in the short run. It seems that the
shock is almost entirely absorbed by the quantity variables, even in the short
run! We know by Proposition 4 that only these variables are aﬀected in the
long run. Whether the obtained short run dynamics are robust to changes in
the environment (notably to the value of d) is an interesting issue that will
be tackled in the next sub-section. Yet it is important to understand why a
17shock on the level of disembodied technical progress can produce the results
we have obtained in the benchmark case.
























Notice that such a shock raises the marginal productivity of both production
factors, labor and capital. So, it tends to increase both. Now, one should
recall that the capital stock (in eﬃciency units) can be raised either by in-
vesting more in the capital sector (which is detrimental to consumption) or
by increasing the eﬃciency level of the new capital goods, which in turn con-
sists in increasing adoption labor since γ is ﬁxed. The latter strategy would
be attractive if the technology sector could ensure a gain in the eﬃciency
of capital goods (ie.a r i s e i n q) big enough to compensate the induced
labor allocation unfavorable to the production labor in a context of rising
marginal productivity of labor. If not, the adjustment will mainly take place
via the quantity variables. This is exactly what happens in our benchmark
case. Output, consumption and investment rise. However, the increment in
output (and in consumption) is markedly lower than the increment in invest-
ment, which is far from surprising since for example production labor slightly
decreases. Consequently the investment rate sharply rises at t =1 . Finally,
the resulting technological gap is almost constant over time because of the
18very limited scope of the reallocation of labor resources. Again, the techno-
logical acceleration does not produce any short term intense adoption eﬀort.
However, in contrast to the acceleration in the rate of embodied technical
change, the response of the economy is now characterized by an investment
boom in the short run.
3.2 Institutions, policy and optimal adoption
We now study the robustness of the results listed above to changes in the
policy variable d. This is done in two steps.
(i) Figures 3 to 5 also report the results of a permanent shock on d for
the benchmark economy. From Proposition 3, we know that the economy
will converge to a lower adoption labor but will achieve a smaller technolog-
ical gap. So in the long run, labor allocation is favorable to the production
sector, and to consumption. In the short run, the economy takes advan-
tage of the improvement in education and/or trade policy and institutions
by sharply raising adoption labor. So in contrast to the case of techno-
logical accelerations, institutional and policy improvements in the
technology sector can carry out a massive adoption eﬀort in the
short run. Note however, that the subsequent decrease in production labor
does not lead to a drastic cut in the consumption level. Indeed, at the same
time, the optimal allocation of the ﬁnal good is detrimental to the capital
sector (see Figure 5).
(ii) In a last experiment, we study the response of the economy to techno-
logical accelerations for a value of d,t e nt i m e sb i g g e rt h a ni nt h eb e n c h m a r k
case. The results are reported in Figures 6 to 8. In the case of the γ shock,
we get no massive and immediate adoption eﬀort after the acceleration, ex-
actly as in the benchmark case. There are however some clear quantitative
diﬀerences. First of all, the initial drop in the adoption eﬀort is less sharp
and it takes only 4 periods to the economy to get above the initial steady
state value (it takes 8 periods in the benchmark case). Hence, under better
institutions and policy for monitoring technology adoption, the intense phase
of adoption starts much earlier, and it converges to a higher adoption labor
value and to a lower technological gap (in percentage change with respect to
the steady state value).
I nt h ec a s eo ft h eA shock, the diﬀerences with respect to the benchmark
case are not only quantitative. Recall that such a shock induces an increase
19Figure 6: The evolution of the percentage deviation of the labor devoted























in the capital stock which can be achieved either by investing more in the
capital sector or by increasing adoption labor. Recall also that the latter is an
attractive decision if the technology sector could ensure a gain in the eﬃciency
of capital big enough to compensate the induced drop in the production
labor. In the benchmark case, this condition fails to hold. In the case of
large d values, it holds. As a consequence, both adoption labor and the
investment rate are boosted in the short run. The pattern of adoption labor
induces a decrease in the technological gap in the short run. This is the
unique case we ﬁnd for early and intense adoption eﬀorts, as a response to
technological accelerations. Note that this case only concerns the level of
disembodied technical progress, and more importantly, it is generated for
d values large enough. That is to say the state of policy and institutions
around the technology sector is absolutely crucial in the design of optimal
technology adoption schedules.
20Figure 7: The evolution of the percentage deviation of the technological






















Figure 8: The evolution of the percentage deviation of the investment rate























214C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Using a simple three sector model with embodied technical progress, scarce
skilled labor resources and a limited capacity of technological absorption, we
study the optimal timing of technology adoption. Our main result is the
sub-optimality of an immediate increase in the adoption eﬀort in response
to an acceleration in the pace of embodied technical progress. The phase
of intense adoption (as measured by the share of labor resources devoted
to this activity) should be delayed, the exact optimal timing depending on
the education and trade policies and institutions at work in the technology
sector. In the context of the digital divide debate, our model implies that
the latter should not be on the top of any program of economic develop-
ment (abstracting away from the connectivity issue). The speciﬁcn a t u r e
of the technological progress conveyed by the ICT and the weakness of the
technology sectors in the South makes this debate irrelevant in our view.
If adoption is so problematic in such a case, what could be an alternative
short term policy? Boucekkine, Martinez and Saglam (2001) suggest that the
maintenance of capital goods should be taken very seriously in general, and
more speciﬁc a l l yi nt h eS o u t hs i n c ea ni n c r e a s ei nt h em a i n t e n a n c ee ﬀort
ensures a rise in the (detrended) income level in the long run. As far as
preventive maintenance is concerned, the skill requirements are probably
less stringent than those for technology adoption, and maintenance is likely
to ﬁt better the skill composition of the developing countries. We are still
investigating these issues within more comprehensive set-ups allowing for
skill heterogeneity of labor resources.
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236 Appendix
1. P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
Proof. By means of successive substitutions, one can reduce the system




















1−α − β (1 − δ)
  =0 . (11)














1−α − β (1 − δ)
  < 0
lim
u→1G(u)=+ ∞,a sγ > 1, β < 1,d > 0.
Thus there exists a unique u∗ ∈ (0,1) which satisﬁes G(u)=0 .
2. P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
Proof. The comparative statics are derived explicitly. For sake of sim-












1−α − (1 − δ)
 
> 0,a n d
M =



















[β − γ (1 + duθ (1 + (1 − u)θ))]
> 0
24It is clear that the denominator is always negative for all values of u. The





. By means of the equi-
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β − 1 − duθ 
(1 + duθ)γ − β
 
− αθdu
θ+1 (1 − u) < 0,
so that ∂TG
∂γ > 0.
















γd2 [β − γ (1 + duθ (1 + (1 − u)θ))]
< 0.





















1−α − β (1 − δ)





3. P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :




1−α > 0, where x stands for
K, C, Y and I. Moreover, from the explicit expression of s given just above,
∂s
∂A =0 .



















































































































It +( 1− δ)
∼
Kt−1γ
−1
1−α
t
∼
Y t =
∼
At
∼
K
α
t
∼
L
1−α
t
∼
Ct +
∼
It −
∼
Y t =0
∼
Lt +
∼
ut =1
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